July 12, 1999
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright will lead the U.S. delegation
to Singapore to attend the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) July 25-26 and the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference
(PMC)
July 27-28, departing from Washington on Thursday, July 22.
The ARF, now in its sixth year, has become an increasingly important forum
for the promotion of
peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and, for the U.S., a valued
complement to our network
of regional bilateral security ties.
The PMC follows the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and engages the ASEAN
countries
(Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand and
Vietnam) with their "dialogue partners" (Australia, Canada, China, the,
European Union, India,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia and the U.S.).
The ARF and PMC are taking place against the backdrop of the recovery from
the extended
economic crisis which has made its impact felt throughout Asia and in the
U.S. The U.S. will point
to its open markets and its support for social safety net programs as important
elements of that
recovery.
Amidst broad discussions of regional security and cooperation, we expect
issues such as the
situations on the Korean Peninsula, East Timor, and Burma and stability
in the South China Sea to
figure prominently in this year's ministerials in Singapore.
The discussion on nonproliferation will include the implications for the
region of nuclear and
missile testing and the Kargil fighting in South Asia.
Date: 19990726
Text:
Speaking at the sixth ASEAN Region Forum (ARF) in Singapore July 26, U.S.
Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright said Southeast Asian security issues of concern to the
United States include
the rising tensions in the South China Sea; the continuing violence in
East Timor; the repressive
Burmese government's failure to prevent wide-scale narcotics production
and trafficking activities;
the inability of United Nations Special Envoy DeSoto to return to Burma;
and the possibility of an
arms race between India and Pakistan.
Albright said the "central security challenge in Northeast Asia is to preserve
stability on the
Korean Peninsula" and she urged all ARF participants to support efforts
aimed at this end.
Although she encouraged North Korea to reapply for admission to ARF, she
recommended that
ARF not consider any other applicants beyond North Korea for admission
partly because "at 22,
the ARF's membership already risks becoming unwieldy."
Albright said the group needed to communicate and distribute materials
more quickly and
suggested the adoption of an Internet-based, dedicated system should be
explored.
She also encouraged the member states of ARF to continue with their willingness
to reduce
tensions and build trust by voluntarily briefing other members on issues
affecting regional
security, and said such briefings should become a regular element of the
ARF process.
The United States, she said, supports the idea of establishing a "good
offices" role for the ARF
Chair, so that ARF members to a dispute could call on the Chair for assistance
on a strictly
voluntary basis.
Following is the official text of Albright's remarks to the forum:
(begin text)
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Intervention at Sixth ASEAN Regional
Forum Singapore,
July 26, 1999 As released by the Office of the Spokesman U.S. Department
of State
Fellow ministers and distinguished colleagues, I am honored to represent
the United States at this
sixth meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It is also a pleasure
to renew or make
acquaintance with each of you.
I want to begin by thanking Foreign Minister Jayakumar and his government
for their hospitality
and by congratulating them for their leadership of the Forum this past
year. Singapore has worked
hard to advance the goal of Asia Pacific security cooperation, and shown
a real determination to
make this conference a success by encouraging frank and substantive discussions.
That
determination is reflected in the strength of our agenda and provides a
firm platform for a
productive exchange of views.
I also want to thank Foreign Minister Surin and our Thai colleagues for
the superb job they have
done as co-chairs, with the United States, of the Intersessional Group
on Confidence Building
Measures (ISG/CBMs). I look forward to working with them even more closely
in the year ahead, as
Thailand serves as Forum chair. I look forward, as well, to cooperating
with Japan and Singapore in
their capacity as ISG co-chairs.
The United States is a strong supporter of the ASEAN Regional Forum. In
this period of advanced
technology and rapid change, it is essential that nations consult and cooperate
wherever possible
on matters of shared security concern. This Forum provides us with an indispensable
means for
doing just that.
As we scan the horizon in the Asia Pacific today, we see potential dangers
and real opportunities
for progress. This poses a test of leadership and vision for us all. Together,
we must strive to build
on shared interests, increase mutual confidence, resolve differences and
create the basis for lasting
stability, prosperity and peace.
The Security Implications of the Asian Financial Crisis
Last year, when we met in Manila, large parts of the Asia Pacific were
experiencing or threatened by
economic and financial crisis. There was real concern that the crisis would
spread and produce
instability that would undermine security and political relationships in
the region.
The crisis has caused very substantial hardships and suffering. And as
a matter of economic and
social policy, we have much left to do to restore growth and help those
most affected get back on
their feet.
But in the realm of security, we can be thankful that our fears have not
been realized. In fact, one
effect of the crisis has actually been constructive. The changes in government
that may be traced,
at least in part, to economic disruptions have been generally positive.
As a rule, the new
governments in our region have shown a deeper understanding and commitment
to financial
transparency, political openness and democratic principles than their predecessors.
This bodes well for the stability of these governments and for our ability,
as a group, to work
together effectively on security concerns.
The Strategic Relationship of the Major Powers and Its Impact on the Region
In the Asia Pacific region, as elsewhere, mutual security depends on mutual
cooperation and effort.
To these ends, the United States continues to play an important and constructive
role.
This is reflected in our treaty alliances with five major countries in
the region. It is shown by our
effort to develop strong and multifaceted bilateral relationships with
key nations, including fellow
members of the UN Security Council. It is illustrated by our forward-deployed
military presence.
And it is evidenced by our strong support for regional and subregional
dialogues aimed at
resolving hard problems and preventing conflicts.
The cornerstone of our support for stability is our alliance with Japan;
an alliance our two
governments have taken steps to modernize during the past few years.
As we have previously made clear, the new U.S.-Japan Joint Security Guidelines
we have
developed are situational, not geographical. They are not directed against
any particular country,
nor were they devised with any particular contingency in mind. Rather,
they are needed to update
our alliance in a manner that reflects the realities and complexities of
the new era. Japan's
fundamental defense policy is unchanged.
Together, the United States and Japan have contributed much to regional
stability by supporting
the Agreed Framework on Korea and other nonproliferation measures, by encouraging
democratic
development, and by working along with the IMF and World Bank to facilitate
economic recovery.
America's relationship with China is also a key to the Asia Pacific's future.
My government is
strongly committed to its policy of purposeful and principled engagement
with China. This
approach serves the interests of both our countries and of the region,
as a whole. In recent years, it
has yielded important dividends towards controlling the spread of weapons
of mass destruction
and promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula.
During the past few months, several events have complicated Sino-U.S. relations.
We believe these
matters should be dealt with in accordance with the fundamental logic underlying
our strategic
dialogue. That logic provides no guarantee of agreement, but it does envision
diligent and good
faith efforts to avoid misunderstandings and narrow differences where possible.
The United States also seeks to cooperate with Russia, not only on European
security, but on
matters affecting the Asia Pacific, as well. For example, we are determined
to intensify our
discussions with Moscow on how to jump-start the process of strategic arms
reductions and to
deal with new missile threats without abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. Success in these
efforts would make Asia and the entire world more secure.
More generally, we welcome initiatives by nations within the region to
strengthen bilateral
relationships. Last May's successful visit by Korean President Kim Dae-jung
to Moscow has the
potential to contribute significantly to security cooperation in the future.
The same is true of the
important steps that have been taken by national leaders in Japan, China
and the Republic of Korea
to promote closer ties and deeper mutual understanding.
The Security Environment and Challenges in Southeast Asia
South China Sea: Along with many other countries, the United States is
increasingly concerned
about rising tensions in the South China Sea.
Several nations have sought recently to bolster their claims in the area
by building or upgrading
outposts. Incidents at sea have multiplied. Tensions have risen. And we
have all been reminded
that unresolved territorial disputes can spark violence that leaves no
one better off.
The stakes are too high to permit a cycle to emerge in which each incident
leads to another with
potentially greater risks and graver consequences. We cannot simply sit
on the sidelines and
watch. Nor can there be any doubt that this is an appropriate Forum for
discussion of this issue.
All members of the ARF have an interest in peace and stability in the South
China Sea.
So we must ask ourselves whether we are doing all we can to find diplomatic
approaches, identify
confidence building measures, and take other concrete steps to stabilize
the situation and make a
peaceful resolution in the area more likely.
Indonesian Democratization: The United States congratulates the people
of Indonesia for the
successful and nonviolent conduct of their historic June 7 national elections.
All segments of
Indonesian society deserve credit for this major stride towards meaningful
multiparty democracy.
As Indonesians are the first to recognize, however, additional hurdles
must be surmounted before
their journey will be complete. Foremost is the need for the People's Consultative
Assembly to act
with transparency and integrity in selecting the next President.
East Timor: The deployment of the UN Mission in East Timor is a positive
development. With
others, we encourage both pro-independence and pro-integration East Timorese
to work together
to build a future better than the past.
We are deeply concerned, however, by continuing violence that could create
an atmosphere of
intimidation and preclude a fair referendum. We look to the Indonesian
Government to meet its
obligation to create a secure and credible environment for the August vote.
Burma: Burma continues to pose a threat to regional stability because of
the government's failure
to prevent wide-scale narcotics production and trafficking activities,
and because its repressive
policies have created strife and caused the outflow of refugees.
The United States urges Burma to shift direction and begin a dialogue with
the democratic
opposition, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and other representative groups.
We support the UN role
in encouraging this, and are disappointed that Special Envoy DeSoto has
not yet been able to
return to Burma, despite several requests over the past six months. We
call upon the Burmese
authorities to allow such a visit as soon as possible.
The Security Environment and Challenges in Northeast Asia
The central security challenge in Northeast Asia is to preserve stability
on the Korean Peninsula.
We urge all participants in this Forum to support efforts to that end.
We cite, specifically, President Kim Dae-jung's policy of engagement with
the Democratic Republic
of North Korea (DPRK); the Four Party Talks; and the policy review led
by former U.S. Secretary of
Defense William Perry. These initiatives have in common a desire to reduce
the isolation of the
DPRK, address humanitarian needs, and prevent potentially destabilizing
military developments.
Leaders in the DPRK should be in no doubt about the willingness of the
ROK, the United States,
Japan and others in the region to respond positively and substantively
to constructive actions and
concrete indications of restraint on their part. They should also know
that such steps would be
profoundly in the interests of their people who suffer greatly from North
Korea's dismal economic
situation.
The United States encourages the DPRK to take advantage of the opportunity
that now exists to
improve relations and to begin to participate more fully in the economic
and political life of the
region. We also encourage all nations to continue to support implementation
of the Agreed
Framework in recognition of its contribution to regional stability.
The Security Implications of Transnational Issues: Nonproliferation, Terrorism,
and Transnational
Crime
Nonproliferation: There is no more important global or regional security
challenge than
strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. To this end, the United
States is: (1) working for
timely entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; (2)
promoting negotiation of
a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and in the interim seeking a moratorium
on fissile material
production; (3) striving to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
through the NPT review
process; (4) urging support for strengthened IAEA safeguards; and (5) discussing
with Russia
how best to continue reducing our stockpiles of strategic weapons.
Other advanced weapons technologies concern us as well. Thus, we are working
to strengthen
controls on ballistic missiles and other sensitive technologies; striving
to give teeth to the
Biological Weapons Convention; and moving to implement the treaty that
seeks to banish poison
gas worldwide.
The dangers posed by these categories of weapons and technologies are clear.
It is in the interests
of every country represented here to contribute in every way it can to
international nonproliferation
efforts.
South Asia: Last year's nuclear and missile tests have intensified the
spotlight on proliferation
issues in South Asia. We urge both India and Pakistan to avoid steps that
would lead to an arms
race, and hope that both will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and
support negotiation of a
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in Geneva.
Terrorism: Governments participating in this Forum are united in their
opposition to international
terror, which has claimed victims in every part of every continent on Earth.
The United States urges
the ARF to serve as a regional rallying point for effective international
action to deter and disrupt
terrorist networks and to oppose those who finance, harbor and support
them. By making life more
complicated and less secure for terrorists, we will make it better and
safer for our citizens.
Transnational Crime: Whether directly or indirectly, transnational crime
harms us all. Left
unchecked, it can fray the fabric of our societies and threaten the security
of our nations. We
believe this Forum has a distinctive contribution to make in this region's
fight against
transnational crime. We support the proposal to convene an experts group
to consider how best to
deal with such issues as small arms trafficking and piracy and armed robbery
at sea.
Track I Activities
The Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures made significant
progress this
year by implementing or proposing measures that include the U.S.-Brunei
hosted Professional
Development Program and Australia's planned seminar on the Law of Armed
Conflict. We also urge
all ARF members to support and implement the new maritime CBMs.
Our ISG Co-Chair, Thailand, deserves much credit for its work on the "overlap"
between CBMs and
Preventive Diplomacy. The four proposals outlined in the Thai working paper
would assist parties
to a dispute, with their consent, to resolve differences before they affect
other ARF members.
We see particular value in a willingness on the part of member states to
reduce tensions and build
trust by voluntarily briefing other members on issues affecting regional
security. We hope this
approach can become a regular element of the ARF process.
The United States also supports the idea of establishing a "good offices"
role for the ARF Chair, so
that ARF members to a dispute could call on the Chair for assistance. This
would be done on a
strictly voluntary basis, and would be similar to the role played by the
ASEAN Troika in Cambodia.
We recognize that this Forum's evolution must proceed at a pace with which
its members are
comfortable. We acknowledge that we are likely to progress in increments,
not giant leaps. It is
important, however, that we continue to move in the direction of concrete
and effective security
cooperation. It is in that spirit that we look forward to further examination
of preventive diplomacy
by the ISG in the year ahead.
The Future Direction of the ARF
Membership: We believe that when North Korea is ready to do so, it should
reapply for admission
-- on the same terms as any other qualifying country. Otherwise, the United
States supports a
period of consolidation. At 22, the ARF's membership already risks becoming
unwieldy. And aside
from North Korea, no other appropriate applicants exist within the East
Asia/Oceania region.
Institutionalization: As this Forum matures, it will need to communicate
and distribute materials
more quickly. We hope the ISG study of an Internet-based, dedicated system
will help.
Some form of institutional structure will also likely be needed, which
should take into account the
interests of all ARF members. No specific decisions are yet necessary --
but it may be wise to begin
discussing general approaches soon.
Conclusion
I want to again thank Singapore for hosting this Conference and for its
praiseworthy effort to
ensure a focused discussion of the security challenges that confront our
region.